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Abstract 
 
The Five Star Movement (M5S) formed the Eurosceptic EFDD Group when it first elected its 
members in the European Parliament (EP) in 2014. Two and a half years later, the M5S sought, 
without success, to leave the Eurosceptics and join the Liberal group. This attempted change of 
transnational affiliation is puzzling:  why has the M5S tried to leave the Eurosceptic group to ally 
with the most Europhile group in the EP? How could this U-turn be explained? Relying on several 
different data – the EUANDI party dataset, official EP data, and original interviews with members of 
the EP – this article provides a systematic answer to these questions. We test three general hypotheses 
on group membership in the EP, using the M5S as a case-study. We show that neither policy 
congruence nor the pursuit of office fully explain the M5S’s observed or attempted alliances. We 
suggest, instead, that ‘domestic politics’ is the key driver of the M5S’s behaviour in the EP. Political 
group membership is functional to   the Movement’s strategic objectives at home. This article shows 
that national-level explanations of transnational affiliation need to be given more consideration, and 
highlights the ‘second order’ importance of the EU arena with respect to ‘first order’ national strategic 
objectives. 
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Introduction 
 
In January 2017, when the leader of the Five Star Movement (hereafter: M5S) Beppe Grillo attempted 
to switch political group in the European Parliament (EP), moving his contingent of 17 deputies from 
the Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) group to the very pro-European 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in Europe (ALDE), several members and observers of the M5S 
raised their eyebrows. Why would one of the most Eurosceptic parties in the Italian party system seek 
to enter one of the most pro-EU political groups? What was the rationale behind such a surprising 
decision? 
The academic attention for the origins, electoral success and ideology of the M5S has steadily grown 
(i.e. Conti and Memoli 2015; Manucci and Amsler, 2017; Passarelli and Tuorto 2016). The bulk of 
research has focused on domestic politics, with only scattered attention paid to its EU activities. The 
notable exception has been its Euroscepticism, with empirical work on its discourse and voting 
behaviour in the EP (Corbetta and Vignati 2014; Franzosi et al. 2015). This article shifts the focus on 
the M5S in Europe, analysing the contentious issues of its transnational affiliation. It seeks to 
understand why Grillo’s Movement entered an alliance with Nigel Farage’s United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) in 2014, and attempted (without success) to break it in early 2017.  
This work is a case-study of political group affiliation in the EP. Theoretical arguments on the motives 
for political parties to choose their ‘home’ in the EU are applied to the case of the M5S. Building on 
the literature on political group formation in the EP (Benoit and McElroy 2010; Bressanelli 2012; 
McDonnell and Werner 2017), national parties are expected to join a political group for 
ideological/policy compatibility; for the office gains that membership in a (large) group brings in the 
EP; or to pursue their vote or office-seeking objectives at the national level. In this sense, this article 
not only aims to provide a better understanding of the behaviour of the M5S in the EU, but also 
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contributes to research on the politics of group affiliation in the EP – placing its analytical focus on 
the motivations of national parties in their choice of transnational allies. 
The theoretical arguments are assessed triangulating different data: from the EUANDI data on the 
position of political parties in Europe to official data of the EP; from original interviews with members 
of the EP (MEPs) to declarations to the press or in Beppe Grillo’s blog. In a nutshell, what this article 
argues is that neither policy nor office considerations at the EU-level can fully explain the 
transnational affiliations (observed and attempted) of the M5S in the EP. The real drivers of its 
choices were strategic considerations at the domestic level. In other words, for the M5S group 
membership was functional to the pursuit of more prominent domestic goals.  Be it the expansion of 
its electoral support with more Eurosceptic voters in 2014, be it its governing ambitions after the 
failed constitutional referendum of December 2016, the ‘second-order’ EU-related choices of the 
Movement have been instrumental to its changing, ‘first-order’ domestic goals.  
This paper proceeds as follows. After presenting some background information on the affiliations of 
the M5S in the EP (Section 2), three theoretical arguments on group membership are advanced 
(Section 3). Their empirical assessment is presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 discusses the 
broader implications of the findings, and what they mean both for the nature of the M5S and for 
transnational affiliation in the EP.  
 
Choosing partners in the European Parliament 
 
In June 2014, the grillini – so are called the supporters of Grillo’s M5S – were asked to cast their 
online vote via Grillo’s blog to decide which political group should be joined by the 17, newly-elected 
M5S MEPs. Three options were given: the EFD group, comprising right-wing, Eurosceptic parties 
including, most prominently, the UKIP; the European Conservatives and Reformists group, whose 
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largest national delegation are the British Tories; and the non-attached. For the M5S statute, its MEPs 
shall refrain from joining any political group, unless there is “the possibility of setting up, in the 
European Parliament, a political group with members from other European countries who share M5S’ 
fundamental values”. Should this occur, Beppe Grillo, in his capacity as political leader, shall submit 
a proposal to M5S registered members for online ratification. 
Grillo’s preferred option was the EFD group. In a blog post published on the same day of the poll, 
the M5S leader stressed that, within the EFD, M5S MEPs would enjoy freedom of votes. Furthermore, 
he maintained that: 
 
[The EFD] has represented in the previous legislature the most strenuous opposition to 
a federalism based on austerity and to the concentration of power in the hands of 
unelected bureaucrats in Brussels. The EFD is against the euro which has caused poverty 
and unemployment. (Grillo 2014b) 
 
In the same piece, Grillo highlighted how UKIP, the biggest party in the EFD group, supported direct 
democracy and stood against ethnic discrimination, big banks, multinational corporations and 
excessive bureaucracy. Nonetheless, these arguments failed to persuade numerous M5S supporters, 
who blamed the decision to join a political group comprising national parties renowned for their 
nationalistic and anti-migration stance. Moreover, the M5S leadership was reproached for excluding 
from the options given in the online poll the Greens/EFA group (G/EFA), whose political platform 
was perceived as close to the M5S’ stance on environmental issues. Grillo addressed this criticism by 
pointing that it was the G/EFA group to cross out, in the first place, the possibility that the M5S 
delegation might join its ranks. However, an analysis of news accounts suggests that the G/EFA group 
was officially approached by the M5S leadership only after talks started with UKIP. On May 28, three 
days after EP elections, Grillo flew to Brussels to meet with Farage. Two days later, the co-chair of 
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the European Green Party - the extra parliamentary equivalent of the G/EFA group - declared to the 
Italian press that doors were still open for talks with the M5S.1 Nevertheless, the official request to 
the Greens was sent on June 3 only. The following day, the G/EFA Secretary general replied:  
 
According to our information, the agreement between the Five Star Movement and Nigel Farage is 
now in its final phase. It is precisely for this reason that we have doubts on whether its request for 
dialogue is genuine or simply a front for a decision which has already been taken. […] Our group 
will not be able to meet you until your relationship with Farage’s group is clarified. (quoted in Grillo 
2014d)  
 
The above provides evidence to claim that, independently from the G/EFA’s refusal, the political 
marriage with UKIP was Grillo’s preferred choice. This option obtained eventually most of the votes 
in the online poll. The M5S joined the UKIP and other small parties (see Table 1), and the EFD was 
lately renamed Europe for Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD). 
Table 1 about here 
 
In January 2017, the grillini were called back to the online polls. This time, half-way through the 
legislature, their leader was asking them to ratify the decision to leave the EFDD for joining the ALDE 
group. The other two voting options were either remaining in the EFDD group or joining the non-
attached members. The U-turn was announced on the very same day of the vote via the usual blog 
post, and came as a surprise not only to M5S supporters but to some of the MEPs themselves: “As a 
M5S MEP, I was not aware [of this decision], just like you activists. I have found out about this news 
this morning, with astonishment and concern” (Zanni 2017).2 Interestingly, it was not long before that 
Guy Verhofstadt, the ALDE group leader, was defined as “unpresentable” and depicted as “the 
                                                 
1 Available at: <http://greenitalia.org/verdi-ue-frassoni-nessuna-chiusura-a-m5s-ma-no-a-chi-sta-con-farage-o-le-pen/> 
[Accessed on 7 November 2017]. 
2 We translated into English all excerpts from interviews and other sources. 
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politician who, within the EP, best embodies the idea of a centralised European super-state” (M5S 
Europa 2015). The snap online vote raised criticism both among the M5S membership and within the 
party in public office. Grillo answered them back maintaining that “refusing to join a political group 
means […] occupying a seat of power with tied hands: in other words, it means impossibility to work” 
(Grillo 2017) 
At the end, Grillo’s proposal to join the ALDE group won the approval of 78.5% of the voters. Yet, 
the union between the M5S and the ALDE group eventually failed to materialize due to the latter’s 
veto. Nonetheless, the question arises of what the rationale behind these antithetical choices is. In 
other words, why joining a Eurosceptic group in the first place, and opting to leave it in favour of the 
most Europhile EP group two years and a half later? As Grillo put it, joining the EFDD was “nothing 
but a marriage of convenience for our mutual advantage” (Grillo 2014a). The dowry of this marriage 
should consist of EP offices and resources. The divorce was then officially asked on the basis that 
“recent European events, notably Brexit, ask us […] to rethink the nature of the EFDD group” (ibid.). 
But are these justifications corroborated by evidence? We will address this question after reviewing 
the main scholarly hypotheses put forward to explain transnational affiliation in the EP. 
 
Explaining group choice in the European Parliament 
 
The provisions contained in the EP Rules of Procedures (RoP) on the formation of the political groups 
are quite loose. Art. 32 only states that “members may form themselves according to their political 
affinities”. However, the criterion of political affinities is not scrutinized by the EP, which assumes 
that members forming a group share by definition a common platform. Only when political affinities 
are explicitly denied, the EP may call for the dissolution of a group (cf. Settembri 2004).  
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The RoP are, instead, much more specific on the numbers needed to form a group. At the beginning 
of the 2014 term, a political group had to include at least 25 members elected in a quarter of the 
member states (i.e. seven countries). Therefore, while the RoP provide specific numerical indications, 
they leave a significant margin of manoeuvre regarding the political affinities between members. 
Moving beyond the (vague) legal provisions, scholars have therefore suggested three main 
explanations for group choice in the EP. 
A first explanation is that ideological or policy affinities matter, and national parties choose the 
political group that best matches their ideological or policy position. Traditionally, this argument has 
been based on the commonality of the cleavages in the (West) European party systems, which 
‘produced’ distinct and rather cohesive party families (Mudde and Mair 1998). From this perspective, 
parties get together because their share common socio-political bases and programmatic identities. 
To put it metaphorically, ‘birds of a feather flock together’, and enter durable marriages.  
More recently, several studies have supported the enduring validity of this explanation. For instance, 
analysing national election manifestos, Klingemann et al. conclude that political groups “have a 
strong basis in the old party families” (2006, 28). Hix et al., looking at voting behaviour in the EP, 
argue: “politics in the European Parliament […] is driven by the traditional party families” (2007, 
181). In a study modelling transnational group affiliation, Benoit and McElroy (2010) test whether 
policy congruence is the main predictor of party group ‘choice’. They find substantial evidence that 
this is indeed the case, with the national parties seeking membership in the group closer to their own 
policy position on the most salient policy dimensions. Finally, studying the formation of the groups 
at the start of the 2009-14 legislature, Bressanelli (2012) finds that policy or ideological affinity is 
the most important factor predicting transnational affiliation. 
For other observers, instead, the choice of a political group is mostly guided by the pursuit of office 
goals in the EP. For instance, the British Conservative Party established an alliance with the EPP 
Group (which was then renamed EPP-ED) even if they deeply disagreed over the EU (Maurer et al. 
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2008). The regulatory framework in the EP provides strong incentives to form loosely bound political 
groups. Both the transnational groups and the national parties face strong self-interested incentives 
to, respectively, include more members and seek membership in the existing groups. Several 
dispositions in the RoP reward the larger groups more. Votes in the Conference of Presidents – the 
key executive organ of the EP – are weighted by the number of MEPs in each group. Therefore, the 
larger a group is, the bigger its ‘voting power’. While the non-attached members are invited, they do 
not have voting rights. Furthermore, the D’Hondt method – which, albeit proportional, brings better 
rewards to larger parties – is normally used when allocating office positions like committee 
chairmanships. The point-system method used to allocate reports at the committee stage also favours 
the larger groups more. Finally, the RoP (art. 162.3 and 162.4) make clear that the order and the time 
allocated to speakers in the plenary debates also depends on the size of the groups. Alliances between 
national parties where opportunistic motives dominate are metaphorically labelled “marriages of 
convenience” (Maurer et al. 2008). 
A third explanation for political group membership looks, instead, at the importance of vote- and 
office-seeking motivations at the national level. While the two arguments presented above place their 
analytical focus on policy- and office-seeking motivations at the EU-level, other research explores 
the impact that the EU level choices of political parties have on the national arena. Studying four 
radical right parties, McDonnell and Werner (2017) argue that these parties have compelling reasons 
to focus on their national electorates when making their EU-level alliances. When mainstream parties 
create a cordon sanitaire and refuse a priori cooperation with radical parties, transnational alliances 
can help the latter to gain ‘respectability’. For instance, both in the case of the Finns Party and the 
Danish People’s Party, their choice to ally with the European Conservatives and Reformists Group 
was motivated by their desire to gain legitimacy to widen their electoral appeal and/or strengthen 
their coalition potential with future partners in the national government. This two-level game is most 
likely to be played by parties in the ‘shadow’ of a general election. 
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While radical-right parties provide a particularly good illustration of this argument, there is no reason 
to restrict a ‘domestic politics’ explanation to this sub-set of parties. For instance, the Italian party 
Forza Italia had long flirted with the EPP Group, before becoming eventually a member, in order to 
be seen as a respectable governing party (cf. Jansen 2006). Such alliances, where one of the partners 
seeks an ‘upgrade’ of its status, have been labelled “marriages of respectability” (McDonnell and 
Werner 2017).   
Moreover, ‘respectability’ to pursue office and vote-seeking objectives at home is only one specific 
instance of a ‘domestic politics’ explanation. In other cases, the domestic goals of the party can be 
advanced by the ‘publicity’ it gains through transnational affiliation. The UKIP, for instance, has been 
very effective to use the EP and its group as a springboard to broaden its electoral appeal in the UK 
(Whitaker and Lynch 2014). 
The political groups also have their own incentives to admit or reject an application for membership. 
Policy- and office-seeking explanations apply to them as well. On the one hand, they may be strict 
on the ideological compatibility of the new members, making sure that only those parties strictly 
belonging to the ‘party family’ join – not to undermine their cohesion and capacity to pass legislation. 
On the other, they have strong incentives not to be overtly demanding on the ideological compatibility 
of the new members. Financial resources are distributed among the political groups considering both 
their size (the number of MEPs) and their territorial heterogeneity (the number of member countries). 
The bigger a group and the more countries are represented in it, the more resources it is endowed with 
(Corbett et al. 2016). Furthermore, the quota of financial resources the EU extra-parliamentary parties 
are allocated largely depends on the number of seats of their associated groups in the EP.3 Excluding 
large national parties from membership entails a direct financial cost for EU-level political parties. 
Finally, some apical positions in the EP hierarchy are only allocated to the largest, or the pivotal, 
political groups. While the focus of this article is on the rationale behind the M5S choice to join, or 
                                                 
3 Regulation (EC) no. 2004/2003 of 4 November 2003 (consolidated version). 
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consider joining, different political groups, it is important to underline that the ‘success’ of the former 
crucially depends on the willingness of the latter to accept its membership.  
In conclusion, there are three main arguments to explain the choice by a national party of a particular 
transnational group in the EP. Policy congruence accounts for most of the cases, but not all marriages 
are marriages of ‘love’. Some others are functional to the pursuit of offices in the EP; still others are 
instrumental to the pursuit of domestic goals. The next section assesses which argument(s) best 
explains the M5S’s transnational affiliation, and attempts to change it. 
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Empirical Analysis 
Policy congruence 
To assess whether policy affinity was the key driver of the choice of the M5S to ally with the UKIP, 
and later seek to abandon it for the ALDE group, we rely on the EUANDI data (Garzia et al. 2017). 
The EUANDI project created a Voting Advice Application through which voters could match their 
policy preferences with political parties competing for seats in the 2014 EP elections in the 28 EU 
member countries. Parties were asked to self-place themselves with respect to 30 salient policy issues 
grouped in nine policy domains. The party self-placement was double checked by country experts, 
who coded the position of the parties in case of no-answer or undocumented position, but also had 
the final word on the coding (i.e. when the party self-placement did not appear convincing to the 
experts when compared with sources like the EU election manifesto or the party election platform). 
This iterative method of party positioning is what distinguishes the EUANDI data from other 
established data. As Garzia et al. note, none of the established techniques to place parties in a 
policy/ideological space has evolved into a “gold standard” (2017, 334-5). The coding of national 
and Euro-manifestos, the survey of experts on political parties, the scaling of roll-call votes all have 
their strengths and weaknesses. Indeed, as one prominent scholar suggested, the weaknesses of the 
existing methodologies may be overcome “triangulating” different data (Marks 2007). Here lies, 
instead, the strength of the EUANDI data, which in its design combines the party self-placement and 
the coding of experts, with the latter also based on a plurality of sources. 
Substantively, the EUANDI project was specifically created to study party competition in the 28 
member states of the EU ahead of the 2014 elections, including all the parties which were expected 
to win seats in the EP. This means that even small parties from small member states are part of the 
dataset, which includes 96 percent of the MEPs (720/751). For both methodological and substantive 
reasons, the EUANDI data is therefore particularly useful to study the congruence of the M5S in the 
EFDD group and alternative options. 
12 
 
To compare the position of the parties in the policy space, we used principal component factor 
analysis with varimax rotation to extract the common underlying dimensions to the 28 policy issues 
which were coded by the EUANDI team for all EU member states. Each answer to the survey question 
has values ranging from -2 to 2.4 ‘No opinions’ have been merged with neutral answers, and both 
have been coded as zeros (cf. Borz and Rose 2010).  
Following established conventions, we retained all factors with eigenvalue bigger than, or equal to 
one (Kim and Mueller 1978). On substantive ground, we used in the analysis the first four returned 
factors, which we interpret as EU Integration, economic left-right, immigration and security, and 
socio-liberal left-right.5 The validity of the former two scales – on EU integration and economic left-
right – has been assessed by comparing them with the established measures in the Chapel Hill expert 
survey (Polk et al. 2017). The correlation between the EU integration scales is strong (r=0.78; 
p<0.001), and that between the economic left-right scales is also robust (r=0.72; p<0.001). These 
results reassure on the validity of the scales generated from the EUANDI party dataset for use in our 
analysis. 
To assess the policy fit of the M5S with its current political group, and the other options considered 
by its leadership, we looked at the policy differences among them (Table 2). Based on the EUANDI 
data, the M5S has a moderately Eurosceptic position, a left-wing political agenda in economic policy 
and socio-liberal values, but a tougher approach on immigration and security matters. The EUANDI 
data present a conventional picture of the positions of the political groups, calculated as the 
(weighted) average of the position of the member parties. Mainstream and fringe political groups are 
split on the issue of EU integration, while the ALDE group is much closer to the more right-wing 
                                                 
4 The original values ranged from -1 to 1. 
5 The table in the Appendix shows the loadings of the 28 policy items on the four factors, which explain together 58 
percent of the variance. Policy items 1, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 26 and 28 in the EUANDI dataset have been reversed 
to facilitate the interpretation of results. 
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EPP on economic policies, and to the more left-wing groups (the S&D and the G/EFA) on socio-
liberal issues.  
In this context, it is hard to say what the best fit for the M5S is. Its position is closer to that of the 
ECR on EU integration and immigration and security; to the G/EFA on economic left-right, and to 
the GUE/NGL on socio-liberal issues. On average, the group closer to the M5S on the four dimensions 
is the GUE/NGL, but the G/EFA is also close. What is, instead, clear is that the M5S poorly fits with 
its current political group. The EFDD is, together with the EPP, the group with which the M5S has 
the least in common in terms of policy. Differences are particularly stark on the economic left-right 
dimension, but the hard-Eurosceptic position of the EFDD group is also quite different from the M5S 
critical, but more moderate position on the EU. 
Table 2 about here 
Figure 1 displays the policy positions of the member parties of the ALDE, the G/EFA, and the EFDD 
group6 on the bi-dimensional space defined by two most important policy dimensions in the EP: 
economic left-right and EU integration (Hix and Lord 1997). Clearly, the M5S and UKIP have two 
different policy platforms, not only on the left-right dimension, but also on EU integration. This was 
confirmed during our face-to-face meetings with the UKIP and M5S MEPs.7 Consulted on the matter, 
a UKIP MEP expressed surprise at the fact that the M5S was gaining popularity in Italy as a 
Eurosceptic party despite exhibiting very little Euroscepticism inside the EP. This stance was 
confirmed by a EFDD colleague from the M5S, who maintained that: 
 
Over time, different views have emerged between UKIP and us. […] We have a different 
approach towards the EU as well. Yes, we do belong to the same Eurosceptic group, but, as 
                                                 
6 The EUANDI data allow us to capture the position of all the member parties of the EFDD group, except for the Czech 
Free Citizens Party (1 MEP) and, obviously, the other independent member from Latvia. 
7 Semi-structured interviews were conducted in May 2016 in the European Parliament in Brussels. One of the A. – 
interviewed 20 MEPs from the major British and Italian parties. The names of the interviewees are kept confidential by 
agreement (full transcript and recording stored by the A.). 
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you know, they are for withdrawing from the EU and ending the process of European 
integration tout court. Our Euroscepticism is instead to interpret as a claim to build a 
different Europe […] not to destroy it. 
(Interview, M5S MEP, 26 May 2016) 
 
Focusing on the two other political groups with which the M5S considered an alliance in EP8, 
members of the ALDE group have unsurprisingly very different positions on economic policies, but 
its parties share a pro-EU platform.8 On the other hand, the G/EFA members have a more varied 
position on integration, with some critical positions, and are located on the left of the policy spectrum. 
On policy-grounds, membership in the G/EFA would appear to be a better fit for the M5S.  
Figure 1 about here 
The EUANDI data provide a clear picture: it is not policy the glue that made the M5S and the UKIP 
stick together. To investigate this aspect further, we analyse the voting behaviour of the M5S in the 
first two years of EP8. We only focus on votes under the ordinary legislative procedure which, after 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, became the standard law-making procedure. We further 
restrict our sample by studying final votes which, since 2009, must all be by roll-call. In this way, we 
deal with the bias in the study of roll-call votes in the EP – namely, that they may be called for 
strategic reasons, and are therefore unrepresentative of the full population of votes (see Mühlböck 
and Yordanova 2015). Under these restrictions, we analyse 87 votes from July 2014 to July 2016.9 
We look at the voting agreement of the M5S with the political groups. We consider a case of 
agreement when a majority of members of the M5S and most members of a political group voted in 
                                                 
8 In the ALDE, there are only two member parties placed in the lower side of the integration spectrum: the Swedish 
Centre Party is a pro-EU party, but opposes the monetary union and the Euro as a currency for Sweden; the Slovak 
party Freedom and Solidarity is, instead, a truly Eurosceptic party. Indeed, in October 2014 already it left the ALDE 
group to join the ECR.  
9 We further excluded repeals of obsolete acts and votes on Stabilisation and Association Agreements  
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the same way (i.e. they either voted in favour, against, or abstained). We classified our votes in four 
broad policy categories: ‘EU Integration’, which includes votes on institutional matters and new 
programmes or funds; ‘Single Market’, with votes on the regulation of the single market; ‘Custom 
Union’ for trade with non-EU countries, and ‘Home Affairs and Migration’, for legislation on rights 
and migration. 
Once again, the poor fit with the EFDD is evident. Table 3 shows that the overall agreement between 
the M5S and the EFDD is the lowest of all political groups: in less than half of the legislative votes 
the M5S and the UKIP voted in the same way. The voting agreement of the M5S is never too high 
with any of the groups, but it is the highest, at almost 70 percent, with the GUE/NGL. Not 
surprisingly, when the voting agreement is disaggregated per policy area, the data show that the M5S 
and the UKIP have a better working relationship on EU Integration issues (voting together about 90 
percent of the times), but tend to vote very differently on the regulation of the single market, the 
custom union and home affairs and migration. In the latter areas, voting agreement scores are higher 
with the ALDE, the GUE/NGL and, especially, the G/EFA.  
Table 3 about here 
Office gains 
While the decision of the M5S to join the EFDD is not explained by policy congruence, it could pay 
off in terms of office gains. Has the formation of the EFDD – where the M5S is the second delegation 
in terms of size – allowed Grillo’s Movement to obtain positions of power and influence in EP8? To 
shed light on these issues, we have examined the ‘mega-seats’ and legislative reports that the M5S 
MEPs have partaken since their entry in the EP in July 2014. Below, we first discuss the Movement’s 
gains and losses in terms of leadership positions in committees. We then focus on the number of 
legislative reports obtained by its MEPs during the first half-term of EP8. 
Mega-seats (Carroll et al. 2006) are the key offices in a legislative assembly. In the context of the EP, 
the most coveted offices consist of the presidency and vice-presidency of the EP; chair and vice-chair 
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of parliamentary committees; group leadership and group coordination on committees (see Benedetto 
2015, who also includes quaestors). Seeking these key positions once elected is in line with the idea 
that political parties pursue office goals in addition to vote and policy ones (Strøm 1990). As a matter 
of fact, “parties neither cease to exist or cease to compete for office when the general election is over” 
(Carroll et al. 2006, 154). Beppe Grillo seemed aware of this when he dismissed the idea of joining 
the non-attached members, despite this being presented as the ideal option in the M5S’s statute. As 
known, the legislative rules in the EP are such that non-attached members remain excluded from the 
contest for key EP positions, and are allotted very little speaking time. Allegedly, therefore, a 
marriage between the M5S and UKIP was nothing but “a tactical move” through which “elect 
Parliament’s Vice-Presidents and committee chairs who can then influence choices” (Di Maio MP, 
quoted in ANSA 2014). However, if office-goals supposedly drove its group membership, the 
question remains as to why the Movement joined the EFDD rather than other groups, notably the 
G/EFA group, larger than the EFDD and closer to the M5S in ideological terms. We show that the 
M5S has indeed lost in terms of mega-seats by joining the EFDD.  
As Carroll et al. point out, the allocation of mega-seats is determined by both formal and informal 
rules (2006, 156). This is the case in the EP as well, where “the EP’s internal rules make national 
parties’ group affiliation the defining factor in the distribution of committee seats” (Maurer et al. 
2008, 248). More specifically, according to the D’Hondt method, parliamentary power is 
proportionally distributed in the EP. Yet, the D’Hondt formula is not mentioned in the EP rules of 
procedure, but it is used following a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ between the political groups. This 
agreement was broken at the start of EP8. The M5S bid for four vice-chairs (AGRI, BUDG, ITRE, 
PECH), for the chair of PETI and for one of the vice-presidencies of the EP. Yet these positions ended 
up being distributed among S&D, EPP and ALDE members. Most notably, the failure in attaining the 
chair of PETI, which received considerable resonance on M5S’ web platforms, was provoked by the 
anti-EFDD coalition between ALDE, EPP and S&D – defined by Grillo as “the Triple” (Grillo 2014c) 
17 
 
– during the ballot for the election of the bureau on the very first session of the PETI committee. The 
trend was partially reversed at the start of the second half-term, when the M5S secured the vice-chair 
of JURI, although it did not belong to the EFDD according to the D’Hondt distribution of posts. 
More systematic insight is provided by comparing the share of mega-seats obtained by the EFDD 
with that of the other EP groups. In doing this comparison, we consider only those mega-seats 
assigned via inter-group competition. Hence, group leadership and coordination on committees, 
whose allocation is determined by intra-group dynamics, are not pertinent here. Mega-seats have been 
weighted using Votewatch’s weights for assessing MEPs’ influence in the EP (VoteWatch 2016, see 
Appendix for details). We have then calculated each group’s mega-seats ratio, defined as the ratio of 
mega-seats score and the number of group members.  
Tables 4 displays each group’s mega-seats score and ratio during, respectively, the first and second 
half-term of EP8. Despite a slight improvement during the second term – the 5 points consist of the 
JURI vice-chair – EFDD’s performance in terms of mega-seats is poor, and Grillo’s office-based 
explanations behind the choice to join the EFDD are not corroborated by evidence.10 
Table 4 about here 
In addition to leadership positions, we also considered the legislative reports obtained by the EFDD. 
As noted by Yoshinaka, McElroy and Bowler (2010), rapporteurs are indeed very influential 
legislators in the EP, particularly when they are responsible for legislation negotiated under the 
ordinary legislative procedure. In order to gauge the different power MEPs hold, in terms of reports, 
within different groups, we constructed a report ratio to compare the success of the EFDD with that 
                                                 
10 To rule out unfulfilled office expectations as a driver for the M5S’ attempts at changing political group, we compared 
the EFDD’s mega-seat ratio for EP8-1 against the EFD’s mega-seat ratio for EP7-2. Whilst scoring slightly better in 
absolute terms (0.29 in EP7-2), the EFD is placed last in the ranking in both cases. Furthermore, its mega-seat ratio is 
less than half that of the group placed second to last, i.e. GUE/NGL. For details, see the online supplement tables. 
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of the other political groups. The ratio is calculated by dividing the number of codecision (COD) 
reports11 obtained by a group by the number of members within that group. 
Table 5 about here 
Table 5 reveals that the EFDD scores last in terms of reports ratio. Once more, the choice of the 
EFDD does not seem to pay off as much as other transnational affiliations. True, transnational party 
membership – and being a large delegation in a political group (Hausemer 2006) – is not the only 
factor to explain the allocation of reports. Personal characteristics of the rapporteur like, for instance, 
her seniority in the EP and expertise in the policy field, also matter (Daniel 2013; Yordanova 2011). 
In our case, the latter may explain why the M5S – despite being only the second largest delegation in 
the EFDD (see Table 1) – obtained all the codecision reports that were allocated to this group. Yet, 
particularly in budgetary and – significantly for our purposes – codecision reports, “the party 
identification of an MEP is crucial for his chances to draft reports” (Hurka and Kaeding 2012, 525; 
Hurka et al. 2015, 1238). Thus, for instance, the French Mouvement Démocrate – a member of the 
ALDE with only 4 MEPs – has obtained the same number of codecision reports as the M5S. Clearly, 
membership of the EFDD penalises those members, and parties, which aim to obtain legislative 
reports. 
The above suggests that neither policy congruence nor office gains fully explain the rationale behind 
the M5S’ group membership in the EP. Thus, the next section explores the argument that domestic 
considerations were the main driver for the M5S and its leader when choosing which EP group to 
join.    
Domestic politics 
                                                 
11 In line with Yordanova (2011, 109), we considered substantive reports only, excluding codifications and adaptations 
to new procedures (e.g. comitology). We also excluded shadow reports because they are not allocated via inter-group 
competition. 
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Both hypotheses on policy congruence and office benefits focus on activity at the EU level. However, 
parties may also use transnational membership to pursue domestic goals. In other words, membership 
in a political group could be functional to other, more important objectives that the party seeks to 
fulfil at home. If neither policy congruence nor office advantages fully account for the choices of the 
M5S in the EP, could the explanation for its swinging behaviour be found in Italian politics? 
In a context of growing Euroscepticism and saliency of the EU for Italian public opinion (cf. Conti 
2016), the EU issue could be used by the M5S to expand its electoral support. Ideological flexibility 
characterises the M5S’ political discourse, which, as result, can strategically adapt to the evolving 
socio-political context (Manucci & Amsler 2017). Figure 2 may therefore offer some preliminary 
insights on the decision of the M5S to join the EFDD group in July 2014. After 2011, the share of 
Italian citizens with a very negative or fairly negative image of the EU has matched that of those with 
a very positive or fairly positive view. Towards the end of 2013, for the first time ever, the share of 
negative answers was larger than the share of positive answers. 
Thus, membership in the EFDD could be part and parcel of the Movement’s strategy to address the 
demand for anti-EU opposition expressed by a growing share of Italian voters. In other words, the 
M5S could use “Euroscepticism as a strategic resource to increase public support in a context of 
growing disillusionment of the Italian public opinion towards the European Union” (Maggini 2014). 
The hardening of its position vis-à-vis EU integration appeared even more resolute a few months 
later, when the M5S started the collection of signatures for an advisory referendum on whether the 
country should leave the Euro. Clearly, joining the EFDD was in line with the M5S’ domestic strategy 
aimed at riding on Italians’ growing disaffection with the EU project.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
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If this explanation for membership in the EFDD is plausible, the attempted change of political group 
in January 2017 is puzzling. Figure 2 shows that the mood in Italian public opinion did not change, 
and Italian citizens were as sceptical towards the EU at the end of 2016 as they had been in 2014. 
What did change in the meanwhile, however, was the overall political context. In early December 
2016, the Prime Minister Matteo Renzi lost a referendum to reform the constitution and, 
consequently, resigned. Suddenly, political parties faced a new political scenario. 
Crucially, public opinion appeared to have partly turned away from Renzi and the Democratic Party 
(PD). Figure 3 provides polling data on voting intentions from May 2014 to March 2017. In May 
2014, the Democrats obtained over 40 percent of the votes at the EP elections (see Bressanelli 2015). 
However, the graph shows that the margin between the M5S and the PD has become progressively 
narrower. Towards the end of 2016, according to several polls, the M5S had finally become the first 
Italian party, with the trend consolidating in the early months of 2017. 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Arguably, the referendum outcome “[has speeded up] the M5S’ preparations for the climb to the 
national government” (Perrone 2016). The Democrats’ defeat helped the M5S to considerably 
increase its blackmail potential, and its elites seemed aware of it. Indeed, hints at the M5S’ change of 
attitude multiplied between December 2016 and January 2017, in both declarations and actions by 
leading M5S figures. On the same day as the result of the constitutional referendum was announced, 
Grillo published a blog post revealing the M5S’ government plan for the energy sector (Grillo 2016). 
A few days later, Alessandro Di Battista MP told the German newspaper Die Welt that the Movement 
was ready and determined to go to elections as early as possible (Reuscher 2016). The day after, his 
party colleague and vice-president of the Chamber of Deputies, Luigi Di Maio, stressed the urgency 
for a new electoral law, considered a necessary, preliminary step for new general elections (Il Sole 
24 Ore 2016). Concrete actions soon followed these declarations. Most crucially, on 15 December 
2016, Davide Casaleggio, son of the M5S co-founder, published a Facebook post announcing that the 
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M5S proposed government plan will soon be voted online by registered members (Casaleggio 2016). 
Later, on 26 January 2017, Grillo sent a letter to the President of Italy, Sergio Mattarella, outlining 
the necessity to elect a new government as quickly as possible. Hence, between December 2016 and 
January 2017 the Movement evidently changed tactics and strategies within the domestic arena. As 
Paolo Becchi, who was once considered the ideologist of the Movement, maintained: “the M5S has 
now become a liquid party […] whose only objective is to govern” (Picardi 2017). 
The changes inside the national arena were soon reflected on the M5S’ actions at the supranational 
level. Indeed, as a M5S MEP put it, for the M5S the national and the supranational arenas are not 
separate: “The goal is to coordinate more and more, as much as possible, in order to have consistency 
at different levels – European, national, regional and so on and so forth. […] The idea is to be as 
blended and coherent as possible at all levels” (interview, M5S MEP, 26 May 2016). This observation 
brings support to the idea that the attempted move at the European level might have been driven by 
the new political scenario which opened up within domestic borders. While the affiliation with the 
EFDD group could suit well a ‘protest’ party, the ALDE group represented a better fit for a 
‘governing’ party. Interestingly, a survey conducted in January 2017 among M5S supporters shows 
significant support for the idea linking the M5S’ attempt to switch transnational group to changes in 
domestic circumstances. Specifically, to the question as to why the M5S tried to leave the EFDD 
group, 33 percent of respondents affirmed: “Because the Movement is transforming more and more 
into a moderate and [potentially] governing political force”.12 Further confirmation to this 
interpretation comes from the ALDE leader himself. Questioned about the rationale for seeking an 
alliance with Grillo’s Movement, Verhofstadt declared: “The delegation head came to us saying his 
party no longer wanted to cooperate with Nigel Farage. He said they wanted to be a 'less classic' anti-
                                                 
12 SWG for Corriere della Sera. 2017. “Per quale motivo, secondo lei, Grillo ha deciso di cambiare gruppo al 
Parlamento Europeo? (RISPONDE CHI VOTA M5S)”, 12 January 2017, in Il Movimento 5 Stelle e l’Europa. 
Retrieved from www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it. It should also be noted that 36% of respondents answered: “in order 
to count more within the EP”, thus supporting the claim that joining the EFDD has not helped the M5S to maximise its 
influence at the EU level. 
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European party” (quoted in Banks 2017; emphasis added). Verhofstadt’ statement is indirectly 
supported by influential media outlets. For instance, it is reported that the M5S started looking for 
new EP allies already in the last few months of 2016. Among them, the ALDE group was the only 
one to accept – in Beppe Grillo’s words – to “open a dialogue” with the Movement (Corriere della 
Sera 2017; Pipitone 2017). This evidence supports the claim that the move towards ALDE was 
initiated by the M5S itself. 
In light of the above, the official explanation provided by Grillo to leave the EFDD - namely the 
outcome of the UK referendum – does not appear compelling. We argue that the answer can be found 
in domestic politics. With the M5S overcoming the PD in terms of (potential) electoral support, a 
mainstream affiliation in the EP was a political signal about the ‘respectability’ of the M5S as a party 
of government. While the affiliation with the EFDD group could suit well a ‘protest’ party, the ALDE 
group represented a better fit for a ‘governing’ party. Such a chameleonic approach is in line with the 
idea that populist parties are equipped with a “thin-centred ideology” (Mudde 2004, 544). Thanks to 
its ideological thinness, the M5S could act as a political chameleon, and make use of the EP arena as 
an extension of the domestic one. Hence, membership in a transnational group is seen as a tool serving 
the domestic political needs of the Movement. Or, as the M5S’ slogan for 2014 European elections 
very aptly put it, “in Europe for Italy”. 
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Conclusions 
This case study adds a piece to the puzzle of political group affiliations in the EP, and enhances our 
knowledge about the nature and EU activities of the M5S. By triangulating different types of data, 
we demonstrate that neither policy congruence nor office gains fully explain the M5S’ behaviour at 
the supranational level. We suggest that domestic politics matters instead. Domestic motives orient 
the behaviour of the M5S delegation in the EP, and provide an explanation for its antithetical choices. 
Hence, in June 2014, in line with the Italian public’s growing dissent over the EU and the process of 
European integration, the M5S joined a Eurosceptic political group. Two years later, following the 
profound change within the Italian political scene and the increased popularity of Beppe Grillo’s 
Movement, the latter tries, without success, to move out of the Eurosceptic group to join a more 
‘respectable’ alliance. Three main conclusions can be drawn here.  
The first conclusion concerns the nature of the M5S and its attitude to European politics. Notably, 
this paper indicates that domestic strategic considerations prevail over ideological coherence at the 
supranational level. In other words, the latter can be sacrificed for the benefit of domestic gains in 
terms of potential votes and offices. Such a high flexibility of the political platform tells us a great 
deal about the populist nature of the Movement (Manucci & Amsler 2017), and confirms the rather 
strategic nature of its Euroscepticism (Franzosi et al. 2015). Just as in national politics, the M5S deftly 
tailors its European strategy to meet “citizens’ most pressing demands” (Conti and Memoli 2015, 
528) and maximise its popularity.  
A further and related remark concerns the role occupied by the EP in the M5S’ strategic toolkit. Such 
a ‘utilitarian’ use of the EP resonates with the usual approach of protest parties to EU affairs. As 
previous research suggests (i.e. Hix 2005, 193), protest parties tend to pay relatively more importance 
to the EP for this is the arena where they score better thanks to the second-order nature of European 
elections. For these parties, the supranational arena may work as a springboard to domestic politics. 
Yet, differently from most protest parties – which tend to be peripheral in their respective 
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constituencies - the M5S does not occupy the margins of the Italian party system. As a result, for the 
M5S the EP represents a secondary, but strategically important arena to be used either as a 
mouthpiece, or as a launching pad for domestic objectives. As Corbetta and Vignati (2014, 56) put it, 
“The European Union […] figures in Grillo’s speeches within a chiefly national framework.”  
The third conclusion concerns transnational group membership in the EP and its broader relevance 
vis-à-vis the multi-level dimension of the EU. By showing that transnational group membership can 
serve purposes other than those internal to the EP, this research confirms the increasing interrelation 
between political parties’ EU and national level choices (cf. McDonnell and Werner 2017). In the 
case of the M5S, policy and office objectives at the EU level – the two main triggers of group choice 
identified by the literature – played at best a secondary role to explain its transnational affiliation. As 
this research demonstrates, the hypothesis that domestic politics drives the M5S’ political group 
affiliation in the EP appears to have a stronger explanatory value.  
Considering the M5S’ core features – i.e. its ‘chameleonic’ approach and ‘liquid’ political platform 
– the question arises as to whether our explanation applies to other cases. The increasing politicisation 
of the EU (cf. Grande and Kriesi 2014) has created “the conditions under which politics travels across 
the EU’s multilevel system” (Koop, Reh and Bressanelli 2017, 3) and fostered the interplay between 
domestic and supranational arenas. This may suggest that far from being an exceptional case, the 
M5S’ approach to transnational alliances just reflects the increasingly intertwined character of the 
EU polity. Further research is welcome to unravel this puzzle by testing the validity of our argument 
for other parties across the EU.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A. Principal Component Factor Analysis of the EUANDI data 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
EU Integration     
EU should patrol borders 0.5832 0.0232 0.4029 0.1075 
EU tax-raising powers 0.6413    -0.3037     -0.2741     -0.2060     
Strengthen EU defence policy 0.7959     0.2248     0.1105     0.0622    
One voice for EU foreign policy 0.8336 0.1107 -0.1385 -0.1002 
European integration is good 0.8149    0.1451    -0.2835     -0.0659     
Introduce Eurobonds 0.5734     -0.4576     -0.1144     -0.1223    
Euro is a bad thing 0.7947     0.1439     -0.1338     -0.0971     
Less veto power for member states 0.7501     -0.1166     -0.1706     -0.1634     
Referendum for any new EU treaty 0.5558     0.2736    -0.2628     0.2463     
Economic left-right     
Maintain social programmes -0.0696     0.7527    0.3565     0.1607     
Reduce pension benefits 0.0873 0.5073 -0.1011 -0-0108 
Reduce government spending 0.2418 0.5782 0.4064 0.1603 
Tax stock market gains -0.0035     0.7565     0.1299     0.0889    
Reduce workers’ protection 0.0690    0.7330     0.2447     0.2045    
More support for the unemployed 0.0310     0.7339     0.2259     0.1478    
Relax austerity policies 0.0549     0.7968     0.0541     0.1840    
Immigration and security     
Limit welfare for immigrants -02958    0.2248     0.6148     0.3164     
Restrictions to immigration -0.1415    0.0442     0.7387    0.3284   
Acceptance of ‘our values’ 0.0706    0.1920     0.6326    0.3697     
Punish criminals more severely -0.2146    0.0936    0.6095    0.3534     
Socio-liberal left-right     
Same-sex marriages good -0.1687     0.1506    0.3477     0.7248    
Stop stem cell research 0.0313 0.0482 -0.0017 0.7063 
Legalisation soft drugs -0.0627     0.1028    0.2154     0.6201    
Legalise euthanasia -0.1194     0.1937    -0.0445     0.7661     
Accept privacy restrictions 0.1020     0.0855    0.1819     0.3268    
Restrict access to abortion -0.1659     0.1480    0.3139     0.7203  
Note: Principal component analysis, varimax rotation.  
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Table B. Scores for the weighting of mega-seats 
 
MEGA-SEATS SCORE 
EP President 40 
EP Vice-President 12 
Committee Chair of BUDG, ECON, ENVI, 
IMCO, INTA, ITRE, LIBE 
12 
Committee Vice-Chair of BUDG, ECON, 
ENVI, IMCO, INTA, ITRE, LIBE 
7 
Committee Chair of AGRI, CONT, JURI, 
PECH, TRAN 
10 
 
Committee Vice-Chair of AGRI, CONT, 
JURI, PECH, TRAN 
5 
Committee Chair of AFCO, AFET, CULT, 
DEVE, EMPL, FEMM, PETI, REGI 
8 
Committee Vice-Chair of AFCO, AFET, 
CULT, DEVE, EMPL, FEMM, PETI, REGI 
3 
 
Source: VoteWatch Europe 2016 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. National delegations in the EFDD group (constitutive session: 1st July 2014) 
 
Party MEPs 
 
Country 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 24 UK 
Five Star Movement (M5S) 17 Italy 
Sweden Democrats (SD) 2 Sweden 
Order and Justice (PTIT) 2 Lithuania 
Free Citizens’ Party  1 Czech Republic 
Independent (coalition ZZS) 1 France 
Independent 1 Latvia  
Source: European Parliament, www.europarl.europa.eu  
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Table 2. The M5S position and policy difference from the political groups 
 
 EU 
Integration 
 
Economic Left-
right 
Immigration and 
security 
Socio-liberal 
left-right 
Average 
difference 
M5S -0.14 -1.14 0.47 -1.13  
 
EPP 
(221) 
 
1.10 
 
0.35 
 
0.19 
 
0.66 
 
1.2 
S&D 
(191) 
1.16 -0.92 -0.22 -0.29 0.8 
ALDE 
(57) 
0.89 0.34 0.34 -0.75 0.8 
G/EFA 
(43) 
0.68 -1.26 -0.77 -0.65 0.7 
GUE/NGL 
(44) 
-0.76 -1.36 -0.57 -0.84 0.5 
ECR 
(69) 
-0.44 -0.28 0.48 0.44 0.9 
EFDD 
(29) 
-1.50 0.96 1.16 -0.74 1.1 
 
Note: policy positions have been weighted by the parliamentary seats of each political party in the EP (in parentheses the 
total for each group). The count for the EFDD excludes the M5S 
Source: elaboration from EUANDI 
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Figure 1. The M5S: current and potential partners in the EP 
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Table 3. The M5S voting agreement with the political groups (July 2014 – July 2016) 
 
 Overall 
(87) 
EU Integration 
(9) 
Single Market 
(42) 
Custom Union 
(21) 
 
Home Affairs & 
Migration (15) 
EPP 0.62 0.22 0.55 0.86 0.73 
S&D 0.62 0.22 0.55 0.86 0.73 
ALDE 0.61 0.22 0.52 0.86 0.73 
G/EFA 0.64 0.33 0.57 0.81 0.80 
GUE/NGL 0.66 0.56 0.60 0.76 0.73 
ECR 0.56 0.33 0.45 0.86 0.60 
EFDD 0.49 0.89 0.43 0.52 0.40 
Note: votes are plenary votes on the whole text under the ordinary legislative procedure. In bold the highest voting 
agreement with the M5S 
Source: elaboration from VoteWatch.eu  
  
36 
 
Table 4. Mega-seats in EP8 
POLITICAL 
GROUP 
MEPs13 MEGA-SEATS SCORE MEGA-SEATS RATIO 
 EP8-1 EP8-2 EP8-1 EP8-2 EP8-1 EP8-2 
EPP 221 217 278 266 1.26 1.23 
S&D 191 189 265 239 1.39 1.26 
ECR 70 74 67 67 0.96 0.90 
ALDE 67 68 85 89 1.27 1.31 
GUE/NGL 52 52 42 42 0.81 0.81 
G/EFA 50 51 56 56 1.12 1.10 
EFDD 48 42 0 5 0 0.12 
ENF - 40 - 0 - 0 
Note: EP8-1 and EP8-2 indicate, respectively, the first and the second half-term of EP-8 
Source: elaboration of data retrieved from the European Parliament’s website. See Appendix for details 
  
                                                 
13 Group seats for EP8-1 as of 25th November 2014; group seats for EP8-2 as of 20th January 2017. The ENF is not 
considered as this group was formed on 15 June 2015 
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Table 5. Report allocation in the 1st half-term of EP8 
GROUP N. MEPS N. COD REPORTS REPORT RATIO 
ALDE 68 28  0.41 
EPP 219 88  0.40 
S&D 191 72  0.38 
ECR 71 22  0.31 
G/EFA 50 10  0.2 
GUE/NGL 52 7  0.13 
EFDD 48 4  0.08 
Source: elaboration of data retrieved from the European Parliament’s website 
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Figure 2. The image of the EU in Italy 
 
Source: Eurobarometer. Note: ‘Don’t know’ answers are excluded 
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Figure 3. Voting intentions  
 
Note: elaboration of polling data from www.termometropolitico.it 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
